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Abstract
In the classical problem of cake cutting (also known as fair division), a resource must be
divided among agents with different utilities so that each agent believes they have received a
fair share of the resource relative to the other agents. We introduce a variant of the problem
in which there is a graph on the agents modeling an underlying social network, and agents
only evaluate their shares relative to their neighbors’ in the network. This formulation
captures many situations in which it is unrealistic to assume a global view by the agents,
and we also find that it exposes interesting phenomena in the original problem.
Specifically, we say that an allocation is locally envy-free if no agent envies a neighbor’s
allocation and locally proportional if each agent values her own allocation as much as the
average value of her neighbor’s allocations, with the former implying the latter. While
global envy-freeness implies local envy-freeness, global proportionality does not imply local
proportionaity, or vice versa. A general result is that for any two distinct graphs on the
same set of nodes and an allocation, there exists a set of valuation functions such that the
allocation is locally proportional on one but not the other.
We fully characterize the set of graphs for which an oblivious single-cutter protocol— a
protocol that uses a single agent to cut the cake into pieces —admits a bounded protocol
for locally envy-free allocations in the Robertson-Webb model, and we give a protocol with
O(n2) query complexity. We also consider the price of envy-freeness, which compares the
total utility of an optimal allocation to the best utility of an allocation that is envy-free. We
show that a lower bound of Ω(
√
n) on the price of envy-freeness for global allocations [10]
in fact holds for local envy-freeness in any connected undirected graph. In this sense, sparse
graphs surprisingly do not provide more flexibility with respect to the quality of envy-free
allocations.
1 Introduction
The fair allocation of resources is a fundamental problem for interacting collections of agents. A
central issue in fair allocation is the process by which each agent compares her allotment to those
of others’. While theoretical models have tended to focus on global comparisons — in which an
agent makes comparisons to the full population — a rich line of empirical work with its origins
in the social sciences has suggested that in practice, individuals often focus their comparisons
on their social network neighbors. This literature, known as social comparison theory, dates
back to work of Festinger [15], and has been explored extensively by economists and sociologists
since; for example, see Akerlof [2] and Burt [9]. The primary argument is that in many contexts,
an individual’s view of their subjective well-being is based on a comparison with peers, defined
through an underlying social network structure, rather than through comparison with the overall
population [20].
In this work, we find that the perspective of social comparison theory motivates a rich set of
novel theoretical questions in classical resource allocation problems. In particular, we consider the
cake cutting problem, which refers to the challenge of allocating a single divisible, continuous,
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good in a fair and efficient manner. The “cake” is intended to stand for a good over which
different agents have different preferences for difference pieces. This problem has a wide range
of applications including international border settlements, divorce and inheritance settlements,
and allocating shared computational resources.
Agent preferences are modeled through functions that map subintervals of the [0, 1] interval,
which represents the entire cake, to real numbers according to the value the agent assigns to that
piece. We normalize these valuations so that each agent’s value for the whole cake is 1. The
entire cake is to be allocated, but agents need not receive a single, continguous interval (and
valuations are additive across pieces).
Following our goal of understanding the properties of local comparisons to network neighbors,
we study cake cutting in a setting where there is an underlying network on the agents, and fairness
considerations are defined locally to an agent’s neighbors’ in the network. Given a graph G and
a cake [0, 1] to be allocated, we define a locally proportional allocation to be one where each
agent values her allocation at least as much as the average value from the allocations given to
her neighbors in G. We define a locally envy-free allocation to be one where no agent envies the
allocation of any neighbor in G. Analogous to graphical games [16], it seems quite plausible that
agents may care about fairness within a local part of the population rather than with respect to
the population as a whole.
As in the global case, it is straightforward to see that a locally envy-free allocation for G is
also locally proportional for G. It is also clear that if H is a subgraph of G on the same node
set (i.e. if it contains a subset of the edges of G), then a locally envy-free allocation for G must
also be locally envy-free for H , since the constraints defining local envy-freeness for G are a
superset of the constraints defining local envy-freeness for H . For local proportionality, however,
the constraints for different graphs G and H (even when one is a subgraph of the other) can
operate quite differently, and so as a first question we ask:
Problem 1 For graphs G and H, what is the relationship between the set of locally proportional
allocations for G and the set of locally proportional allocations for H?
Network topology plays a crucial role in our results. Note that if the network under consider-
ation is the complete graph Kn, then the local definitions coincide with their global analogues; in
this sense, the local formulations contain the standard definitions as special cases. At the other
extreme, if the network is the empty graph In, then any allocation satisfies local envy-freeness
and proportionality. In light of this, we can pose the following problem:
Problem 2 Are there non-trivial classes of graphs for which we can give efficient protocols for
locally envy-free or at least locally proportional allocations?
We believe that, in addition to capturing real-world contexts, posing the cake cutting problem
on a network will give further insight into the structure of the original problem.
We also consider the effect of fairness on welfare as measured through the price of fairness [10].
The price of fairness is defined as the worst case ratio over all inputs between the social welfare
of the optimal allocation (the allocation maximizing the sum of agent valuations) and the social
welfare of the optimal fair allocation— the envy-free or proportional allocation that maximizes
the sum of agent valuations. We will refer to this ratio in the case of envy-free allocations as
the price of envy-freeness, and the ratio in the case of proportional allocations as the price of
proportionality. When there is an underlying graph G governing the comparisons, these ratios
become the price of local envy-freeness and the price of local proportionality for G. We pose the
following question:
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Problem 3 How do the achievable lower and upper bounds on the price of local envy-freeness
and local proportionality depend on the structure of the graph G?
Caragiannis et al. [10] give an Ω(
√
n) lower bound for the price of global envy-freeness and
proportionality, a matching upper bound of O(
√
n) for the price of global proportionality, and a
loose upper bound of n− 1/2 for the price of global envy-freeness.
Overview of Results. With respect to Problem 1, we show that in fact the set of locally
proportional allocations do not satisfy any natural containment relations. In particular, for any
two distinct connected graphs G and H on the same set of nodes, there exists a set of valuations
for the agents and an allocation that is locally proportional for G but not for H . Note that this
includes the case where G is the complete graph, and so global proportionality does not imply
local proportionality on any other connected graph H .
For Problem 2, we start from the structure of the classical Cut-and-Choose solution for two
agents: one agent divides the cake and the other selects a piece. This solution does not provide
any guarantees for global allocations with more than two agents, but with other underlying
graphs G it turns out to have a natural and non-trivial generalization. Specifically, we fully
characterize the family of graphs G for which a locally envy-free allocation can be produced a
by a protocol in which a single designated node performs all the cuts at the outset, based only
on its valuation function.
Finally, for Problem 3, we start from the Ω(
√
n) lower bound on the price of global envy-
freeness, which provides a lower bound for the price of local envy-freeness in complete graphs.
We show that this Ω(
√
n) lower bound on the price of local envy-freeness holds in any connected,
undirected graph G. We consider this to be surprising, because one might think that sparse
graphs provide more flexibility with respect to the quality of envy-free allocations. The known
upper bound for the price of global envy-freeness serves as a loose upper bound for the price of
local proportionality and the price of local envy-freeness.
In outline, Section 2 defines local envy-freeness and local proportionality, and shows that
the former implies the latter, and that both are implied by global envy-freeness. This section
also establishes a lack of equivalence between global proportionality and either of the two local
fairness concepts. Section 3 considers the notion of protocols with a single cutter as described
above, and it characterizes the family of graphs (formally, cones of directed acyclic graphs and
their subgraphs) for which such a protocol can yield a locally envy-free allocation. Section 4
turns to the price of fairness. We conclude by giving a list of open directions that we hope
Problems 1, 2, and 3 will inspire.
1.1 Background on the Cake Cutting Problem
Cake cutting algorithms can be traced back to the Hebrew Bible. In the Book of Genesis, when
Abraham and Lot decided to separate, they were presented with the challenge of dividing up the
land. Abraham suggested to mark the place on which they stand as the cutting point and asks
Lot to pick a side. Lot chose the side that is well-watered and Abraham went in the opposite
direction. This is precisely the Cut-and-Choose Protocol from above, which has been shown to
give envy-free allocations for two agents.
The cake cutting problem has a wide range of applications including international border
settlements, divorce and inheritance settlements, and allocating shared computational resources.
The formal study of the cake cutting problem was initiated in the 1940s due to Banach et al. [7,
17, 26]. Later, Steinhaus observed that the Cut-and-Choose protocol could be extended to three
players, and asked whether it can be generalized for any number of agents [7]. This was resolved
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affirmatively for proportional allocations by Banach et al. [26] and initiated an interesting line
of research for envy-free allocations; see Brams and Taylor [7]. See Procaccia [22, 23] for a recent
survey from a computer science perspective.
A central problem has been finding envy-free protocols. In 1988, Garfunkel [5] even called
this among the most important problems in 20th century mathematics. An envy-free protocol
for any number of agents was proposed by Brams and Taylor [6], but may need an unbounded
number of queries even for four agents. They thus posed the question whether there are bounded,
envy-free protocols for n ≥ 4. Aziz and Mackenize [3] recently provided a bounded protocol for
n = 4. The case for n > 4 remained open until recently when Aziz and Mackenize announced a
discrete and bounded protocol [4]. Although bounded, their solution has a very high multiple-
exponential query complexity and it remains an open question whether there are more efficient
protocols.
The query model was formalized by Roberton and Webb [24]. The focus in this model has
been to minimize the number of cut and eval queries. The cut query, formally cut(x, y, α), asks
an agent for a cut point x such that the subinterval [x, y] has value α to that agent and the
eval query, formally eval(x, y) asks the agent for her ver valuation of the subinterval [x, y]. It is
possible to encode all (decentralized) cake cutting protocols using this model. Note that these
queries do not result in an allocation themselves but rather provide information about the agents’
valuations in order to compute an allocation. The query complexity of a cake cutting problem
is thus the worst case number of queries required in order to output an allocation satisfying the
desired fairness criteria.
Procaccia [21] gives a lower bound of Ω(n2) for envy-free cake cutting, which shows a gap
between this and the Θ(n logn) bound known for the proportional cake cutting problem [19].
Special cases of the problem have also received attention. Kurokawa et al. [18] for example
establish that an algorithm that computes an envy-free allocation for n agents with piecewise
uniform functions using f(n) queries would also be able to compute an envy-free allocation with
general valuation functions using at most f(n) queries. Considering only contiguous allocations,
Stromquist [27] shows that for any n ≥ 3, there are no finite envy-free cake cutting algorithms,
even with an unbounded number of queries. A positive result has been achieved by considering
approximately envy-free allocations [22]. An allocation is said to be ǫ-envy-free if each agent
values the allocation of any other agent to be at most ǫ more than their own. This relaxation
provides a simple algorithm for any n using n⌈1/ǫ⌉ cut queries, as shown in [23]. Alon [1] and
Dubins and Spanier [13] also study allocations under alternate notions of fairness.
Due to the difficult nature of the envy-free cake cutting problem, researchers have imposed
restrictions on different aspects in order to give useful protocols and gain insight into the problem.
A few examples are: restricting valuation functions to be only piecewise constant or uniform [18],
relaxing envy-freeness to approximate envy-freeness [23], considering partial allocations that
simultaneously satisfy envy-freeness and proportionality [11], and limiting allocations to be con-
tiguous pieces [27].
Incentive compatibility is not a standard consideration in the cake cutting literature. One
important exception is the work of Chen et al. [11], who give a polynomial time algorithm outside
of the Robertson-Webb model for finding proportional and envy-free allocations for piecewise
uniform valuation functions and any n, while also achieving strategyproofness.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no preexisting work on the cake cutting problem in
which fairness is determined via comparisons defined by an underlying graph. In perhaps the
most closely related paper, Chevaleyre et al. [12] analyze how the network topology of negotiation
affects the convergence to an envy-free allocation for multiple indivisible goods. In their setting,
agents are only able to negotiate with, and also envy agents that are in their neighborhood.
They ask under what conditions a sequence of negotiations can lead to a state where there is
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no envy. There are a number of differences between this work and ours: first, they consider
indivisible goods, which leads to a different set of questions; and second, in their setting the
network constrains not just the comparisons that are made in determining fairness, but also the
allowable interactions in the division protocol.
2 Relating Global and Local Properties
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} denote the set of agents. The cake is represented using the interval [0, 1]
and a piece of cake is a finite union of non-overlapping (interior disjoint) subintervals of [0, 1].
Allocated pieces are a finite union of subintervals. Each agent i has a valuation function Vi
that maps subintervals to values in R. Given subinterval [x, y] ⊆ [0, 1], we write Vi(x, y) instead
of Vi([x, y]) for simplicity. We assume that valuation functions are additive, non-atomic, and
non-negative. Non-atomicity gives us Vi(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1], so we can ignore boundaries
when defining cut-points. We normalize valuations so that Vi(0, 1) = 1 for each agent i.
Definition 1 (Allocation) An allocation is a partition of the [0, 1] interval into n pieces {A1, A2, . . . , An}
such that ∪iAi = [0, 1] and the pieces are pairwise disjoint. Each agent i is assigned the corre-
sponding piece Ai.
As is standard, this ensures that the entire cake is allocated. If we remove this constraint,
then we can have trivial solutions that satisfy fairness, such as assigning each agent nothing in
the case of envy-freeness. This assumption is a natural one to make since the valuation functions
are assumed to be non-negative and additive and thus satisfy free-disposal. A feasible allocation
is one where no subinterval is assigned to more than one agent.
In order to avoid direct revelation of valuation functions, which may be cumbersome, cake
cutting procedures are typically given as protocols that interact with the agents in order to
output a feasible allocation. The Robertson-Webb query model, which is typically used for cake
cutting protocols is defined with the following two types of queries:
• evali(x, y); this asks agent i for the valuation Vi(x, y).
• cuti(x, y, α): given y, α ∈ [0, 1], this asks agent i to pick x ∈ [0, 1] such that Vi(x, y) = α.
These queries are used to gather information regarding the valuations of the agents and need
not directly determine an allocation. Rather, a cake cutting protocol can use other steps for
determining allocations.
Definition 2 (Query complexity) The query complexity of a cake cutting protocol is the
worst case number of queries that the protocol requires to output an allocation over all possi-
ble valuation functions.
The query complexity of a cake cutting problem is the minimum query complexity over all
known protocols for computing the desired allocation.
2.1 Global and Local Fairness
Given a set of agents and an allocation A = (A1, A2, · · · , An), we formally define two global
fairness criteria:
Definition 3 (Proportional, Envy-free) An allocation A is proportional if Vi(Ai) ≥ 1/n,
for all i ∈ N , and is envy-free if Vi(Ai) ≥ Vi(Aj), for all i, j ∈ N .
5
Suppose we are given a directed graph G = (V,E), where the nodes correspond to agents
and edges signify relations between the agents. In particular, we assume that given a directed
edge (i, j), agent i can view agent j’s allocation. Agent i’s neighborhood is the set of all nodes
to which it has directed edges (i, j), and we denote this set of nodes by Ni. We define i’s degree
to be di = |Ni|. We define local analogues for fairness concepts:
Definition 4 (Local proportional, local envy free) Given a graph G, an allocation A is
locally proportional if Vi(Ai) ≥
∑
j∈Ni Vi(Aj)
|Ni| for all i and j ∈ Ni and locally envy-free if
Vi(Ai) ≥ Vi(Aj).
In a locally proportional allocation, each agent assigns as much value to her allocation as the
average value she has for a neighbors’ allocation. In a locally envy-free allocation, each agent
values her allocation at least as much as her neighbors’ allocation.
When G = Kn, the complete graph on n vertices, these local fairness definitions coincide with
their global analogues. Whereas, if G = In, the empty graph on n nodes, then any allocation
is trivially locally envy-free. So, the graph topology plays a significant role in computing locally
fair allocations.
Lemma 2.1 A locally envy-free allocation A on some graph G is also locally envy-free on all
subgraphs G′ ⊆ G.
Proof We want to show that given a node u and v ∈ Nu, u does not envy v’s allocation in G′.
This follows from the fact that A is a locally envy-free allocation on G, and if (u, v) is an edge
in G′, then it is also an edge in G.
One consequence of this lemma is that local envy-freeness is implied by global envy-freeness.
Since globally envy-free allocations exist for all sets of agent valuations [1], a locally envy-free
allocation exists for every graph G and every set of agent valuations.
Lemma 2.2 If an allocation A is locally envy-free on a graph G, then it is also locally propor-
tional on the same graph.
Proof If an allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) is locally envy-free, then for any i ∈ V , Vi(Ai) ≥
Vi(Aj), ∀j ∈ Ni. Therefore, Vi(Ai) ≥ (
∑
j∈Ni Vi(Aj))/|Ni|.
Therefore, locally proportional allocations also exist. By considering G = Kn, we also recover
that global envy-freeness implies global proportionality. While global envy-freeness implies local
envy-freeness, global proportionality does not necessarily imply local proportionality, or vice
versa, the former of which violates intuition. We provide a counter example.
Example 1 Let n = 4 and G = C4, the cycle graph on 4 nodes, where the nodes are labeled
clockwise. Assume agents 2, 3, and 4 have the uniform valuation function Vi(x, y) = |y − x| for
any subinterval (x, y) ⊆ [0, 1]. Let agent 1 have the piecewise uniform valuation function where
V1 (0, 1/4) = 1/2 and V1 (3/4, 1) = 1/2, and no value for the remaining subinterval. It is easy to
verify that the following allocation is locally proportional on K4,
A = ([0, 1/8), [1/8, 3/8), [3/8, 5/8), [5/8, 1]) .
In particular, Vi(Ai) = 1/4 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and V4(A4) = 3/8. This allocation is however not
locally proportional on C4 since V1(A1 ∪A2 ∪A4) = 1, but V1(0, 1/8) = 1/4 < 1/3. It is also not
locally envy-free since V1(A4) > V1(A1).
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Figure 1: Relationship Between Fairness Concepts
We prove a stronger result regarding any pair of distinct graphs. Note by Ni(H) we mean
agent i’s neighborhood set in graph H .
Theorem 2.3 Given any pair of distinct, connected graphs G,H on the same set of nodes, there
exists a valuation profile of the agents and an allocation A such that A is locally proportional on
G but not on H.
Proof First, consider the case where H is a strict subgraph of G. Pick a node i such that
|Ni(H)| < |Ni(G)|. Let Ni(G) = {i1, i2, · · · , ik} and Ni(H) = {i1, i2, · · · , iℓ} for some ℓ < k.
Assume that all other nodes besides i have a uniform valuation function over the entire cake.
Then, the allocation Aj = ((j − 1)/n, j/n) is locally proportional from the perspective of every
other agent j ∈ N on both H and G. Now, define i’s valuation function to be the piecewise
uniform valuation function where, Vi ((i− 1)/n, i/n) = 1/(|Ni(G)| + 1) and Vi(Ai1 ∪ Ai2 · · · ∪
Aiℓ) = 1− 1/(|Ni(G)|+ 1). Agent i’s valuation for the allocation of nodes {iℓ+1, iℓ+2, · · · , ik} as
well as V (G)\Ni(G) is 0. This allocation A is therefore locally proportional on G. For A to be
locally proportional on H , we need Vi(Ai) ≥ 1/|Ni(H)|. However, since |Ni(H)| < |Ni(G)|, and
Vi(Ai ∪ Ai1 ∪ Ai2 ∪ · · · ∪ Aiℓ) = 1, we only have that Vi(Ai) < 1/(|Ni(H)|+ 1).
Now, suppose H * G. Then, there exists an edge (i, j) in the edge-set of H that is not in the
edge-set ofG. Assume that all nodes k 6= i have a uniform valuation over the entire cake. Suppose
further that we have the allocation where each k is assigned the piece Ak = ((k − 1)/n, k/n).
As above, this allocation is locally proportional from the perspective of each agent k on both G
and H . Define i’s valuation function to be Vi ((j − 1)/n, j/n) = 1 and 0 on the remainder of
the cake. Then, Vi(Ai) = 0 and Vi(Ak) = 0 for all k 6= j. Since j /∈ Ni(G), this allocation is
locally proportional on G. However, it is not locally proportional on H since Vi (∪ℓ∈NiAℓ) = 1,
but Vi(Ai) = 0.
3 Envy-Free Network Allocations
In this section, we consider the question of finding efficient protocols for computing locally envy-
free allocations. We assume that graphs G are directed, unless specified otherwise. When we
mean the component of a directed graph, we will instead take the graph obtained by replacing each
directed edge with an undirected one, and a component in the directed graph is the corresponding
subgraph to the connected component in the undirected analogue. We will use strongly connected
component when we mean to take directed reachability into account.
Lemma 3.1 Suppose we have a bounded protocol for computing locally envy-free allocations on
G. The same protocol can be used to compute locally envy-free allocations on the following two
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classes of graphs: (i) H = G ∪G′ where G and G′ are disjoint components, and (ii) when H is
a graph with a directed cut such that every edge across the cut goes from a node in G to a node
in H\G = G′.
Proof In both instances, we simply apply the protocol on G and allocate agents in G′ the empty
allocation. This is a locally envy-free allocation on H , since no two agents in G envy one another
by the assumption on the protocol, and no agent envies the allocation of another agent in G′.
A few consequences of this lemma are that: given a graph G with more than one connected
component, we can reduce the search for a bounded protocol on G to any one of the connected
components. Furthermore, if G is a directed acyclic graph (DAG), then there exists at least one
node with no incoming edges. Therefore, the allocation where such a node gets the entire cake—
or where it is divided among a set of such nodes —is locally envy-free.
3.1 Directed Acyclic Graphs and Their Cones
We consider a conceptually useful class of graphs for which we can give a protocol with query
complexity of O(n2).
Definition Given a graph G = (V,E), we say that G′ is a cone of G if it is the join of G and a
single node c, which we call the apex. That is, G′ has node set V ∪ {c}, and edge set consisting
of the edges of G, together with undirected edges (u, c) for all u ∈ V . We denote the cone G′ of
G by G ⋆ c.
We consider cones of DAGs. These are the class of graphs where there is a single node c that
lies on all cycles. We now show how to compute a locally envy-free allocation on any graph that
is the cone of a DAG.
c
2 3 n-1 n
Figure 2: Cone of a Directed Acyclic Graph
Protocol 1: Cone of DAGs
1: Agent c cuts the cake into n pieces that she values equally.
2: Topologically sort and label the nodes N\{c} such that for every edge (i, j), i ≤ j.
3: Nodes N\{c} pick a piece they prefer most in increasing order of their index.
4: Agent c takes the remaining piece.
Theorem 3.2 Given a graph G that is a cone of a DAG, Protocol 1 computes a locally envy-free
allocation on G using a bounded number of queries.
Proof We first show that the allocation is locally envy-free. First, there is no envy between agent
c and any other agent since agent c cuts the cake into n pieces she values equally. Therefore, her
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valuation for all the allocated pieces is 1/n. Each of the other agents picks a piece before c, and
so are able to pick a piece that they value at least as much as the remaining piece that agent c
is assigned. Finally, given any directed edge (i, j) such that i, j 6= c, note that Vi(Ai) ≥ Vi(Aj),
since if such an edge exists, then i < j and thus i selects a piece before j.
To count the number of queries, the first step requires n − 1 cut queries by agent c. Then,
each agent i must perform n− i+ 2 eval queries to determine the piece for which they have the
highest value. Therefore, the protocol above uses (n2 + 3n− 4)/2 queries.
The importance of cones of DAGs can be seen in the following result, which shows that they
emerge naturally as the characterization of graphs on which a particular fundamental kind of
protocol succeeds.
Definition 5 An oblivious single-cutter protocol is one in which a single agent i first divides up
the cake into a set of pieces P1, P2, . . . , Pt (potentially t > n), and then all remaining operations
consist of agents choosing from among these pieces.
The classical Cut-and-Choose protocol is an oblivious single-cutter protocol that works for all
sets of valuation functions on the complete, two-node graphK2. Protocol 1 is an oblivious single-
cutter protocol which works for any graph that is the cone of a DAG. We show that subgraphs
of cones of DAGs are in fact precisely the graphs on which oblivious single-cutter protocols are
guaranteed to produce a locally envy-free allocation.
Theorem 3.3 If G is a graph for which an oblivious single-cutter protocol produces a locally
envy-free allocation for all sets of valuation functions, then G is a subgraph of the cone of a
DAG.
Proof Suppose, by way of contradiction, that G is not a subgraph of the cone of a DAG, but that
there is an oblivious single-cutter protocol on G, in which a node i starts by dividing the cake
into pieces using only knowledge of her own valuation function. Since G is not a subgraph of the
cone of a DAG, the graph Gi = G\{i} is not acyclic, so there is a cycle C = (c1, c2, · · · , cm, c1)
in Gv.
Let i have a valuation function such that she produces a partition of the cake into pieces
P1, P2, . . . , Pt. Because agent i produces these pieces without knowledge of the valuation func-
tions of the other agents, we can imagine that we adversarially choose the valuations of the other
agents after these pieces have been produced. In particular, consider the valuation functions in
which each node cj on the cycle C values piece Pr (for r < t) at 2 · 3−r, and the last piece Pt
with the remaining value. These valuations have the property that for each r, the piece Pr is
more valuable than the union of all pieces Pr+1 ∪ Pr+2 ∪ · · · ∪ Pt.
After the protocol is run, each agent cj on C will get a subset of the pieces produced by i.
Let s be the minimum index of any piece allocated to an agent cj on C. Then, the agent cj−1
who has a directed edge to cj will have a union of pieces that she values less than she would value
Ps, and hence envies cj . This contradicts the assumption that the protocol produces a locally
envy-free allocation on G.
We highlight an important connection between computing locally envy-free allocations on
graphs and what is known in the literature as irrevocable advantage. Given a partial allocation,
an agent i is said to have irrevocable advantage over agent j (or dominate j) if agent i remains
unenvious of agent j’s allocation even if the entire remaining piece of the cake (the residue) is
added to agent j’s allocation.
With the additional guarantee that each agent dominates some number of other agents, this
concept is often used to extend partial globally envy-free allocations to complete ones. For
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instance, it is a key concept in the Aziz-Mackenize protocol for K4. Their protocol can be
decomposed to three subprotocols: Core, Permutation, and Post-Double Domination Protocols,
in order. The Core Protocol computes partial envy-free allocation where each agent dominates
at least two other agents, while the Post Double Domination Protocol extends this to a complete
allocation. We will use Protocol 1 to show that given a partial envy-free allocation on Kn where
each agent dominates at least n − 2 other agents, we can extend the allocation to a complete
one, thereby generalizing the Post Double Domination Protocol [3] for any n. This is presented
in Appendix A.
4 Price of Fairness
Finally, we consider the efficiency of allocation from the perspective of local fairness. We follow
the approach introduced by Caragiannis et al. [10] of studying the price of envy-freeness, and
for this we begin with the following definitions. Recall that for an allocation A into pieces
{A1, A2, . . . , An} for the n agents, we use Vi(Ai) to denote agent i’s valuation for its piece.
Definition 6 (Optimality) An allocation A, is said to be optimal if ∑i Vi(Ai) ≥
∑
i Vi(Bi)
for any allocation B. We denote this optimal allocation by A∗.
We define the optimal locally envy-free (resp. optimal locally proportional) allocations, de-
noted by ALEF∗ (resp. ALP∗), analogously by imposing the constraint that A and B be locally
envy-free (resp. locally proportional) and maximizing sum of the values across all agents.
Definition 7 (Price of Local Envy-Freeness, Proportionality) Given an instance of a cake
cutting problem on a graph G, the price of local envy-freeness is the ratio,
∑
i Vi(A∗i )∑
i Vi
(ALEF∗i
) ,
where the sum is over all agents i ∈ N. We likewise define the price of proportionality by taking
the denominator to be
∑
i Vi
(ALP∗i
)
.
We are measuring the degradation in efficiency when considering allocations that maximize
the welfare in both instances under the given constraints. To quantify the loss of efficiency,
we are interested in giving a tight lower and upper bound. More specifically, given a graph G
and a fairness concept in consideration, say local envy-freeness, we seek to find an input (i.e.,
a valuation profile) for which the price of local envy-freeness is high. This corresponds to a
lower bound on the price of fairness. On the other hand, the upper bound will be given via an
argument that shows, for any valuation profile, the price of fairness cannot exceed that stated.
The main result on global envy-freeness, due to Caragiannis et al. [10] is an Ω(
√
n) lower
bound on the price of (global) fairness: there exist valuation functions for which the ratio is
Ω(
√
n). (Very little is know about the upper bound for the price of envy-freeness: an upper
bound of n is immediate, and the best known upper bound is n− 1/2 [10].)
These existing results are for the standard model in which each agent can envy every other
agent. Using our graph-theoretic formulation, we can study the price of local fairness. As defined
in Section 2, this is the ratio of the total welfare of the optimal allocation to the maximum total
welfare of any allocation that is locally envy-free.
The numerator of this ratio— based on the optimal allocation —is independent of G, while
the denominator is a maximum over a set of allocations that is constrained by G. Now, if we
imagine reducing the set of edges in G, the set of allocations eligible for the maximum in the
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denominator becomes less constrained; consequently, we would expect that the price of fairness
may become significantly smaller as G becomes sparser. Is this in fact the case? We show that
it is not. Our main result is that the lower bound for global envy-freeness also applies to local
envy-freeness on any connected undirected graph.
Theorem 4.1 For any connected undirected graph G, there exist valuation functions for which
the price of local envy-freeness on G is Ω(
√
n).
To prove this theorem, we start by adapting a set of valuation functions that Caragiannis
et al [10] used in their lower bound for global envy-freeness. To argue about their effect on
allocations in an arbitrary graph G, we need to reason about the paths connecting agents in G
to others with different valuation functions. This, in turn, requires a delicate graph-theoretic
definition and argument: we introduce a structure that we term a (k, ε)-linked partition; we show
that if G contains this structure, then we can carry out the lower bound argument in G; and
finally we show that every connected undirected graph contains a (k, ε)-linked partition.
Definition For a connected graph G = (V,E), a natural number k ≥ 1, and a real number
0 < ε ≤ 1, we define a (k, ε)-linked partition as follows. It consists of a set L ⊆ V of size k, and
a partition of S = V − L into sets {Si : i ∈ L} each of size at least (εn/k) − 1, such that for
each j ∈ Si, there is an i-j path in S ∪ {i}. That is, each j ∈ Si can reach i ∈ L without passing
through any other nodes of L.
We next show that if a connected undirected graph G has such a structure, with appropriate
values of k and ε, then we obtain a lower bound on the price of local envy-freeness on G.
Lemma 4.2 If a connected undirected graph G has a (k, ε)-linked partition with k = ⌊√n⌋ and
ε, a constant, then there exist valuation functions on the nodes of G for which the price of local
envy-freeness is Ω(
√
n).
Proof Suppose G has a (k, ε)-linked partition consisting of L and {Si : i ∈ L}, where k =
√
n.
Thus, each Si has size at least ε
√
n − 1. (We will assume for the sake of exposition that √n is
an integer, although it is straightforward to slightly modify the argument if it is not.)
We now use a valuation function adapted from the construction of Caragiannis et al [10], who
considered the price of global envy-freeness. We partition the full resource to be allocated, the
interval [0, 1], into
√
n disjoint intervals I1, . . . , I√n. We will give each i ∈ L a valuation vi that
places all value on distinct interval Ii, and each j ∈ S a valuation that is uniform on [0, 1]. The
optimal allocation for this set of valuations has total welfare of
√
n, which is achieved by giving
each i ∈ L the entire interval where it places value.
Now let us consider any envy-free allocation A = {Ai : i ∈ V }. Let µi be a real number
denoting the Lebesgue measure of the set Ai assigned to node i. If j ∈ S, then j’s valuation
for its set, vj(Aj) is equal to µj . If i ∈ L, then i’s valuation vi(Ai) is
√
n times the measure of
Ai ∩ Ii; hence vi(Ai) ≤ µi
√
n.
For each i ∈ L, each j ∈ Si has a path Pj to i entirely through nodes of S; let the nodes
on this path, beginning at i, be Pj = i, j1, j2, . . . , jd = j. The immediate neighbor j1 of i on Pj
must satisfy µj1 ≥ µi, since j1 is in S and hence has a uniform valuation on intervals. For each
successive jt on P , we must have µjt = µjt−1 , since jt and jt−1 have the same valuation on all
sets, and the allocation is locally envy-free. Thus, by induction we have µjt ≥ µi for all t, and
hence µj ≥ µi.
We can now derive a set of inequalities that establishes the lower bound. First we have,
∑
j∈Si
vj(Aj) =
∑
j∈Si
µj ≥
∑
j∈Si
µi ≥ µi(ε
√
n− 1).
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Let us assume n is large enough that ε
√
n− 1 ≥ ε√n/2, so we have,
∑
j∈Si
vj(Aj) ≥ µi(ε
√
n/2).
Since vi(Ai) ≤ µi
√
n for i ∈ L, we have,
∑
j∈Si
vj(Aj) ≥ εvi(Ai)/2. (1)
Thus, the total welfare of the allocation is,
∑
h∈V
vh(Ah) =
∑
i∈L
vi(Ai) +
∑
j∈S
vj(Aj)
=
∑
i∈L
[vi(Ai) +
∑
j∈Si
vj(Aj)]
≤
∑
i∈L
[(2ε−1 + 1)
∑
j∈Si
vj(Aj)]
= (2ε−1 + 1)
∑
i∈L
∑
j∈Si
vj(Aj)
= (2ε−1 + 1)
∑
j∈S
vj(Aj) ≤ (2ε−1 + 1),
where the first inequality is by (1) and the second since
∑
j∈S
vj(Aj) =
∑
j∈S
µj ≤ 1,
because all agents in S get disjoint intervals. Since (2ε−1 + 1) is a constant, while the optimal
allocation has total welfare
√
n, this implies an Ω(
√
n) lower bound for the price of envy-freeness
on G.
Finally, we establish that every connected undirected graph G has a (k, ε)-linked partition
for appropriate values of k and ε. We begin by showing that it is enough to find a structure
satisfying a slightly more relaxed definition, in which the set L can have more than k elements,
and we do not need to include all the nodes of G. Specifically, we have the following definition:
Definition For a connected graph G = (V,E), a natural number k ≥ 1, and a real number
0 < ε ≤ 1, we define a (k, ε)-linked subpartition as follows. It consists of a set L ⊆ V of size
ℓ ≥ k, together with disjoint subsets S1, S2, . . . , Sℓ ⊆ S = V − L, each of size of size at least
(εn/k)− 1, such that for each j ∈ Si, there is an i-j path in S ∪ {i}.
The following lemma says that it is sufficient to find a (k, ε)-linked subpartition.
Lemma 4.3 If a connected undirected graph G contains a (k, ε)-linked subpartition, then it con-
tains a (k, ε)-linked partition.
Proof We start with a (k, ε)-linked subpartition of G, with disjoint sets L of size ℓ ≥ k, and
S1, S2, . . . , Sℓ ⊆ S = V −L. First, for every node v 6∈ L∪S, we assign it to a subset Si as follows:
we find the shortest path from v to any node in L; suppose it is to i ∈ L. We add v to Si. Note
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that this preserves the property that all Si are disjoint, and v has a path to i that does not meet
any other node of L, since if h ∈ L were to lie on this path, it would be closer to v than i is.
At this point, every node of G belongs to L∪S. We now must remove nodes from L to reduce
its size to exactly k while preserving the properties of a (k, ε)-linked partition. To do this, we
choose a node i ∈ L arbitrary, remove i from L, and remove the set Si from the collection of
subsets. We then assign each node in Si ∪{i} to an existing subset Sh exactly as in the previous
paragraph. After this process, the size of L has been reduced by 1, and we still have a partition
of V − L into subsets Si with the desired properties. Continuing in this way, we can reduce the
size of L to exactly k, at which point we have a (k, ε)-linked partition.
Finally, we prove the following graph-theoretic result, which together with Lemma 4.2 estab-
lishes Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.4 For every k ≥ 2 and with ε = 1/2, every connected undirected graph has a (k, ε)-
linked subpartition.
Proof It is enough to find the required structure on a spanning tree T of G, since if the paths
required by the definition exist in T , then they also exist in G. Thus, it is sufficient to prove the
result for an arbitrary tree T .
We root T at an arbitrary node, and let X be the set of leaves of T . If |X | ≥ k, then we
can choose any k leaves of T and partition the remaining nodes of T arbitrarily into sets of size
(n − k)/k to satisfy the definition. Otherwise, |X | < k. In this case, we begin by including all
nodes of X in L.
Now, we process the nodes of T , working upward from the leaves, so that when we get to a
node v in T , we have already processed all descendents of v. Each node is processed once, and
at that point we decide whether to add it to L, and if not which set Si to place it in, given the
current set L. For a node v, we say that w is downward-reachable from v if w is a descendent of
v, and if the v-w path in T does not contain any internal nodes belonging to L.
When we process a node v, we do one of two things:
(i) We label v with the name of a node in L that is downward-reachable from v; or
(ii) We place v in L.
Let b = (εn/k)− 1. We perform action (i) if there is any w ∈ L that is downward-reachable
from v, such that there are not yet b nodes labeled with w. In this case, we label v arbitrarily
with one such w. Since v and all its descendents are now processed, v will continue to have a
path to w that does not pass through any other nodes of L. Otherwise suppose there is no such
w; that is, all w ∈ L that are downward-reachable from v have b nodes labeled with w. In this
case, we perform action (ii). Note that at this point, every w ∈ L that is a descendent of v has
a set Sw of exactly b nodes, and these nodes can all reach w without passing through any other
node of L.
Our procedure comes to an end when we process the root node v∗. There are three cases to
consider, the first two of which are straightforward.
First, if we place v∗ into L, then T − v∗ is partitioned into L and sets {Sw : w ∈ L} such that
|Sw| = b for each w. Thus, if we remove v∗ from L, we have a (k, ε)-linked subpartition, since
the sets Sw are disjoint and of size at least b, and
|L| = (n− 1)/((εn/k)− 1) ≥ (n/(εn/k)) = k/ε > k.
Otherwise, v∗ is labeled with some downward-reachable u ∈ L. Our second case, which is
also straightforward, is that after this labeling of the root, all sets Sw for w ∈ L have size exactly
b, then we have a (k, ε)-linked subpartition.
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If not, then we are in the third case: v∗ is labeled with some downward-reachable u ∈ L, and
after this labeling there still exist downward-reachable nodes w that we have placed in L that
do not have associated sets Sw of size b. We therefore need to prune our set L to a smaller set
that has |Sw| ≥ b for each w ∈ L. The goal is to show that the smaller L we end up with still
has enough elements; if that holds, then we have a (k, ε)-linked subpartition.
To show this, we proceed as follows. We say that w ∈ L is active if |Sw| < b. We first observe
that any active w must be downward-reachable from the root v∗. Indeed, if w is active and not
downward-reachable from the root, then there is a v ∈ L such that w is a descendent of v. But
in the step when we placed v in L, it was not possible to label v with w, and hence we must have
had |Sw| = b at that point.
Next we claim that there are < k active w ∈ L. To prove this, for each active w, we associate
w with a leaf that is a descendent of w. (This can be w itself if w is a leaf.) Observe that the
same leaf x cannot be associated with two distinct active w,w′, for then on the path from v∗ to
x, one of w or w′ would be closer to v∗, and the other would not be downward-reachable from
v∗. Given that we can associate a distinct leaf to each active w, and there are < k leaves, there
are < k active w ∈ L.
We say that a node w ∈ L is inactive if it is not active; that is, if |Sw| = b. Let L0 be the
inactive nodes of L and L1 be the active nodes of L. We have
|L0|+
∑
w∈L0
|Sw|+ |L1|+
∑
w∈L1
|Sw| = n.
We know that |L1| < k and |Sw| < b for each w ∈ L1; hence, using the fact that ε = 1/2, we
have
|L1|+
∑
w∈L1
|Sw| < k + kb = k(b+ 1) = kn/(2k) = n/2.
It follows that |L0|+
∑
w∈L0 |Sw| > n/2. But since |Sw| = b for each w ∈ L0, we have
n/2 < |L0|+
∑
w∈L0
|Sw| = |L0|(1 + b) = |L0|n/(2k),
from which it follows that |L0| > k. We now conclude the construction by declaring L to be L0;
since the sets Sw for w ∈ L0 are all pairwise disjoint and each has size at least b, we have the
desired (k, ε)-linked subpartition.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have introduced a new line of inquiry for the envy-free and proportional cake cutting problems
by considering local notions of fairness. We show interesting relations between these local fairness
concepts and their global analogues. Besides introducing this new model, our main contribution
has been to fully classify the class of graphs for which there is an oblivious single-cutter protocol
for computing locally envy-free allocations. Furthermore, we quantify the degredation in welfare
resulting from adding the local envy-freeness constraint on the allocations; in particular, we show
that the known Ω(
√
n) lower-bound for the (global) price of envy-freeness continues to hold even
for sparse graphs.
It is of interest to give efficient protocols for computing locally envy-free allocations on rich
classes of graphs without the single-cutter constraint. Since local envy-freeness is a stronger
condition than local proportionality, the same problem can also be considered for locally propor-
tional allocations. Finally, whether there is a similar lower bound of Ω(
√
n) for the price of local
proportionality is an open question. Currently, the upper bound for both local fairness concepts
is the loose n− 1/2 bound, and giving tighter bounds is another direction.
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A Taking Advantage of Irrevocable Advantage
Given a partial envy-free allocation, an agent i is said to dominate an agent j, if i remains
envy-free of j even if the entire residue (the remaining subinterval of the cake) is allocated to j.
We can thus define:
Definition 8 A domination graph on n is a graph where V is the set of agents and there is a
directed edge (i, j) if i has irrevocable advantage over j.
Constraints on the number of agents each agent must dominate at a certain stage in the
protocol can be used to extend partial envy-free allocations to complete ones. One salient example
is the Aziz-Mackenzie protocol forK4, where they obtain a partial envy-free allocation using what
they call the Core Protocol and the Permutation Protocol such that each agent is guaranteed to
dominate at least two other agents. They then use the Post-Double Domination Protocol to
extend this to a complete envy-free allocation. We generalize this protocol to any n. That is,
given a partial envy-free allocation such that each agent dominates n − 2 other agents, we can
apply Protocol 1 to extend the allocation to a complete allocation. This provides an alternate
proof to a recent paper by Segal-Halevi et al. [25]. We first define a special class of graphs.
Definition 9 A pseudoforest is a graph where each vertex has at most one outgoing edge.
Each component of a pseudoforest is a subgraph of a cone of a DAG; since each node has at
most one outgoing edge, there are at most n edges. If there are fewer than n, then it is a DAG.
If there are exactly n, then there exists a cycle. Find this cycle and remove an edge e = (u, v)
from the cycle. The resulting graph will be a DAG, and we can therefore Protocol 1 by setting
u = c. This makes the protocol key to extending partial envy-free allocations to complete ones
under particular domination criteria.
Lemma A.1 We can extend a partial globally envy-free allocation in which each agent dominates
at least n− 2 other agents to a complete, envy-free allocation.
Proof Suppose we have a partial globally envy-free allocation (P1, P2, · · · , Pn), with residue R.
If each agent dominates at least n−2 other agents, then the complement of the domination graph,
denoted by Gc, is a pseudoforest. We apply Protocol 1 on Gc using residue R and denote this
allocation by (R1, R2, · · · , Rn). We want to show that (P1∪R1, P2∪R2, · · · , Pn∪Rn) is a globally
envy-free allocation. Suppose it is not. Then, there exists i, j such that Vi(Pi∪Ri) < Vi(Pj∪Rj),
but this is only possible if either Vi(Pi) < Vi(Pj) or Vi(Ri) < Vi(Rj).
The assumption that each agent dominates at least n − 2 agents is necessary. In particular,
suppose that there exists one agent that dominates only n−3 other agents, such as in Example 2.
1 2 3 n-2 n-1 n
Figure 3: Counterexample to the extension lemma.
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Example 2 Suppose that each agent i 6= 2 dominates every other agent but agents i+1 mod n
and that agent 2 dominates agents {4, 5, · · · , n}. The domination graph is given in Figure 3.
The complement of the domination graph is the cycle graph (1, 2, 3, · · · , n, 1) plus the edge (2, 1).
It therefore consists of more than one simple cycle, and hence a direct application of Protocol
1 to the complement of the domination graph will not extend a partial allocation to a complete
allocation.
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